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CASE SUMMARIES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

American Mining Congress v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm 'n, 902
F.2d 781
Author: Judge McWilliams
American Mining Congress ("AMC") sought review of amendments
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("NRC's") criteria relating to
operation of uranium mills and disposition of tailings. Specifically, AMC
challenged the measures to be taken regarding the disposal of uranium
mill tailings to avoid groundwater contamination. AMC argued that
NRC failed to perform an Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
cost-benefit analysis before promulgating the amendments. AMC also
argued that NRC failed to ensure that its regulations were consistent
with the Solid Waste Disposal Act ("SWDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6921. AMC's
final contention was that the "liner" regulation was arbitrary and capricious because it did not reflect an appropriate relationship between
costs and benefits, failed to provide flexibility and opportunity for proposing alternative disposal strategies, and was retroactively applied.
The Tenth Circuit first ruled that NRC may rely on the EPA costbenefit analysis. The court stated that NRC performed its obligation
when it conformed to the EPA regulations it was required to adopt. Second, the court stated that the EPA has not finalized its mining waste
rules under SWDA, so a determination of whether uranium mill tailing
waste is regulated would be premature. Last, the court ruled that the
"liner" regulation promulgated by the NRC was not inflexible, because
it allows a licensee to propose alternatives. Moreover, NRC did not engage in illegal retroactive rulemaking. The court reasoned that NRC
complied with its statutory duties in requiring a "liner."
Anderson v. Food and Drug Admin., 907 F.2d 936
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Anderson, appealed the district court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of defendant, Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and defendant-intervener, Dow Corning Corporation
("Dow"). Anderson attempted, under the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"), to compel the FDA to disclose certain documents submitted
by Dow. The district court held that the requested documents contained confidential information, exempt from disclosure requirements
of the FOIA.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that no evidence of material fact in dispute would preclude summary judgment.
The court remanded, however, for clarification of which documents
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were "confidential" and which were "trade secrets" within the meaning
of exemption 4 of the FOIA. The court held that neither 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905, 21 U.S.C. § 306j(c), nor 21 U.S.C. § 332(j) provided any independent justification for nondisclosure under exemption 3 of the
FOIA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Anderson's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) motion.
Arch Mineral Corp. v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 408
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiffs, Arch Mineral Corporation and Ark Land Company
("ARK"), engaged in several long-term coal leases with the United
States. ARK brought suit to enjoin defendants, Manuel Lujan, Jr., Secretary of the Interior (the "Secretary"), and Barry A. Williamson, Director of the Minerals Management Service, from taking any further
administrative or judicial action to collect "readjusted" rents and royalties allegedly due the United States on the leases. The Secretary counterclaimed, seeking approximately $5,000,000 for underpaid rents and
royalties. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Secretary on ARK's complaint and reserved ruling on the Secretary's
counterclaim pending the resolution of administrative proceedings.
ARK appealed, asserting that: (1) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a), the
Secretary's counterclaim was barred because it was not asserted in earlier "readjustment" cases; and (2) the Secretary lacked statutory authority to collect unpaid royalties by way of agency action.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling against ARK.
The court first held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) does not bar the Secretary's counterclaim. The court reasoned that the Secretary's claims in
the readjustment cases did not mature until ARK filed suit in the instant
case. Second, the court ruled that the Secretary has broad authority
under MMLA (1970). Specifically, the Secretary has the power to collect
royalties through administrative procedures.
Bernstein v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1395
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Bernstein, petitioned for review of a final decision of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary"). This decision
held Bernstein liable under the Civil Monetary Penalties Law ("CMPL")
for submitting false claims for Medicare reimbursement. On appeal,
Bernstein argued that the Secretary's action was barred by the five year
statute of limitations. Moreover, Bernstein alleged that the 1987
amendment, which granted a six year statute of limitations, was not applicable because the Secretary initiated civil penalties against him in
1985.
The Tenth Circuit held that the six year statute of limitations was
applicable and allowed the Secretary's action to stand. The amended
version of the CMPL applied because: (1) the action was commenced
after the effective date of the amendment; and (2) the amendment was
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intended to apply to all proceedings initiated after the effective date.
Additionally, the court reasoned that the Secretary's interpretation of
the CMPL was entitled deference. The court also held that the "retroactive" application of the six year statute of limitations did not violate
Bernstein's constitutional right to due process.
Davidson v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 912 F.2d 1246
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Davidson, applied for worker's disability benefits and
widow's disability benefits. Defendant, Secretary of Health and Human
Services (the "Secretary"), denied Davidson's claim for widow's disability benefits. The Secretary reasoned that her impairments did not meet
the special, stricter disability requirements for the widow's disability
program. These requirements are set forth in the Listing of Impairments, an appendix to the regulation of the Department of Health and
Human Services. The district court reversed and remanded to the Secretary. The district court stated that the Secretary must consider Davidson's residual functional capacity for any gainful activity. Moreover, the
district court stated that the Secretary must not limit its inquiry to
whether Davidson's impairments fit within the listed severe impairments, or its equivalent, as set forth in the regulations. The Secretary
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court ruled that the Secretary
must consider not only whether the claimant has met the listed disabilities, or their equivalent, but it must also consider any medical evidence
relevant to the residual functional capacity of the claimant. The court
found ample evidence in the legislative history that Congress did not
intend the Listing of Impairments to be exhaustive of those which allowed recovery.
Environmental Defense Fund v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm 'n, 902
F.2d 785
Author: Judge McWilliams
The Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") sought review of final
regulations promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
("NRC"). These regulations modified the requirements governing the
licensing of uranium mills and the disposal of uranium mill tailings.
EDF also petitioned for a writ of mandamus to require NRC to engage in
further rulemaking on the subjects. Specifically, EDF argued that NRC
did not conform its regulations to Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") standards for the disposal of mill tailings. Moreover, in its petition for mandamus, EDF sought an order directing NRC to adopt the
missing elements of EPA's standards governing the point of compliance.
The Tenth Circuit first ruled that NRC's general requirements for
management of uranium tailings did not have to conform with EPA standards. The court reasoned that the EPA standards governing point of
compliance were not promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act
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("AEA") and, thus, conformance was not required. Moreover, the court
noted that a high degree of deference is awarded the NRC in its regulatory capacity. Second, the court denied EDF's petition for mandamus.
The court explained that NRC was complying with its duties pursuant to
§ 84(a)(3) of the AEA. Moreover, its comparability study was still in
progress, and NRC was relying on a combination of conformed regulations, policies and license conditions at the tailing sites. Accordingly,
the court found no reason to intervene.
Hecla Mining Co. v. United States, 909 F.2d 1371
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Hecla Mining Company ("Hecla"), appealed the district
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, United
States. This ruling upheld the decision of the Department of Energy
("DOE") which stated that under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation
Control Act ("UMTRCA"), the town of Curita did not qualify as a
"processing site" and, therefore, was not entitled to federal and state
"cleanup" funds. While there was no genuine issue as to material facts,
Hecla challenged the district court's process, standard of review, and
conclusions of law.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Specifically, the court ruled that the district court was correct in reviewing the
reasonableness of DOE's procedures and decision. The court stated
that Congress has specifically authorized DOE to promulgate rules, and
the Supreme Court has held that choice of procedure lies with the
agency. If Congress does not address an issue directly, the court may
decide if the agency's interpretation is a permissible construction of the
statute. Here, the court ruled that the DOE's interpretation was permissible as supported by legislative history. The agency's action was not
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to the law.
Therefore, deference to the DOE's decision was held to be appropriate.
Kansas Corp. Comm'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 894 F.2d 1141
Author: Judge Bohanon, sitting by designation
The Kansas State Corporation Commission ("KCC") sought judicial review of an order by plaintiff, the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"), which granted Missouri Pacific Railroad ("MP"), the right
to abandon sixty-six miles of track. KCC challenged the findings of the
ICC and the sufficiency of the underlying evidence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the ICC, allowing MP to
abandon the specified section of track. The court reasoned that the
ICC's decision was presumptively valid, and its review of the decision
was limited to a determination of whether there was sufficient evidence
to support the decision. In examining the evidence presented regarding
bridge or overhead traffic, revenue impacts, alternate transportation options, impact on local communities, and perfection for abandonment,
the court held there was substantial support for the ICC's decision. The
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court explained that the ICC carefully considered the relevant factors
and weighed the competing interests. Therefore, the court stated ICC's
decision was in accord with the evidence and the law.
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 905 F.2d
1403
Author: Judge Moore
Northwest Pipeline Corporation ("Northwest") petitioned for review of two orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC") which asserted jurisdiction over certain facilities pursuant to
the Natural Gas Act (the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b). Northwest asserted
that § 1(b) of the Act circumscribed the FERC's jurisdiction to regulate
the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce. The FERC, on
the other hand, claimed that no aspect of the interstate business of
transporting or selling natural gas for resale is to be left unregulated by
it. Specifically, the FERC used a primary function test to assert
jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit found error in the FERC's assertion of jurisdiction and remanded for a determination of whether the facilities at issue
were properly exempt from FERC's jurisdiction. The court concluded
that FERC improperly applied the primary function test. In effect, the
FERC placed weight on primarily one factor of the test. The FERC considered mainly status as an interstate pipeline company in determining it
had jurisdiction. The court stated that FERC should have also decided
whether the transportation was incidental to traditional gathering functions and, thus, exempt from its jurisdiction. The court explained that
FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the sale and transportation of natural gas for resale, while Congress expressly reserved to the states the
power to regulate the production or gathering of natural gas. Furthermore, FERC's approach to the primary function test did not comport
with Congress' intent in § 1(b). Essentially, FERC failed to distinguish
between transportation in interstate commerce and any other transportation related to facilities for the production and gathering of natural
gas.
NLRB v. United States Postal Serv., 906 F.2d 482
Author: Judge Brorby
The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") affirmed the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") finding that the United States Postal Service ("USPS") violated § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act.
The charges resulted from the USPS's refusal to reassign an employee,
Richardson, after he engaged in protected concerted activity. The activity was utilizing grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement. After the NLRB affirmed the ALJ decision, the USPS refused to
comply with the order. This action was brought by the NLRB to enforce
its decision.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the NLRB's decision and ordered en-
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forcement of the order. First, the court held that the ALJ properly concluded that the postmaster prevented Richardson's advancement due to
the grievances he filed. The court found that the postmaster's justification for not reassigning Richardson was inadequate. Specifically, the
postmaster did not prove that Richardson would not have been reassigned without the consideration of the grievances filed. Finally, the
NLRB did not abuse its discretion in declining to defer its jurisdiction to
the arbitration agreement, which was required by the collective bargaining agreement.

